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different, but it is difficult to accept his character-
ization of Philippine capitalism as booty capitalism
and Indonesian capitalism as something else. If
booty is understood to be plunder, it can be done by
"bureaucrats" as well as by economic oligarchs.
Probably, the manuscript was completed before
Suharto's fall in May 1998. Otherwise, it is diffi-
cult to understand why he states: "Over the long
term, obstacles to change will tend to be far more
problematic in the patrimonial oligarchic state than
in the patrimonial administrate state, or bureau-
cratic polity" (p. 234). This is probably based on
Ruth McVey's study (quoted on p. 51), but if the
former is taken to be the Philippines and the latter
Indonesia, the statement is not true. It may be true
for Thailand, but definitely not for Indonesia. The
author and McVey seem to be overlooking the dif-
ference in the degree of institutionalization between
Indonesia and Thailand.
One more thing that puzzles me is the use of the
word "oligarch" used to characterize the Philippines
or its political system. Since it is often used in this
way by Philippine specialists, the author may have
just followed the conventional use, but in one sense,
he is using it in a somewhat unconventional way.
His oligarchs start out as economic oligarchs, who
vie to control the state for "plunder." The Lopez
family certainly fits the bill, but Marcos does not.
The author is right in saying that the oligarchs who
controlled the state changed over time (this is to be
contrasted with the view that the same old families
take turns in running the government), but it seems
that many came from the families of modest eco-
nomic means. The Philippine state may be easily
captured by people outside the power circles or
bureaucracy, but it is quite another matter to char-
acterize it as an oligarchical state as the author de-
fines it.
The above critical comments do not apply to the
author's description of the development of Philip-
pine banking, which constitute the bulk of the book.
Strangely, although this is not the author's area of
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expertise, it is here that the book distinguishes it-
self. Banking is an important industry in the Phil-
ippines, but hitherto no systematic attempt has been
made to look into it. The book covers the period
from colonial times to the Ramos administration.
(Yoshihara Kunio <tfJ.jj(J\1=::K) . CSEAS)
Benedict Anderson. The Specter of Compari-
srms: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World.
London: Verso, 1998, 374p.
The introductory chapter is followed by 17 chap-
ters, divided into four parts: three chapters in Part
I, entitled "The Long Arc of Nationalism"; eight
chapters in Part II, "Southeast Asia: Country Stu-
dies"; four chapters in Part III, "Southeast Asia:
Comparative Studies"; and two chapters in Part IV,
"What is Left." Most of the chapters have been
published over the past two decades: only three are
new. But by collecting all these in one place, the
book makes it convenient for us to examine the au-
thor's thoughts on nationalism in general as well as
in Southeast Asia.
If one defines scholarly writings as those which
ordinary readers find it difficult to understand,
Chapter I, entitled "Nationalism, Identity, and the
Logic of Seriality," is the most scholarly, for only a
few readers would be able to understand what the
author is trying to say. The first paragraph would
make most readers stop reading if they did not
know that the author is an eminent scholar on
Southeast Asia and nationalism. Even if they con-
tinued in the hope of being able to understand it af-
ter they had finished reading the chapter, they
would still not make much sense of it. What would
put many readers off would be the unfamiliarity of
the concept of seriality and how it is related to
nationalism.
Although the remaining chapters (at least some of
them) are not necessarily easy to read, they offer a
great deal to the reader who can concentrate on
reading them for a few days. There would not be
much new information or data, but the book offers
many insightful discussions. Due to the lack of
space. it is not possible to list them all. but let me
offer a couple of examples from the first quarter of
the book. On p.65 (Chapter 3, entitled "Long-dis-
tance Nationalism"). the author views the rise of
nationalist movements and their culminations in suc-
cessful nation-states "as a project for coming home
from exile. for the resolution of hybridity, for a
positive printed from a negati\'C in the darkroom of
political struggle." In Chapter 4, entitled "A Time
of Darkness and a Time of Light" which discusses
the philosophy of Soetomo, founder of Budi Utomo
(the first nationalist movement in Indonesia), the
author says that Soetomo did not discard the past in
order to become modern but needed it because he
thought he would "grow up by growing back" (p.
94).
There are. however, unsatisfactory parts. For
example. on p.146, the author says: "Branches of
foreign corporations. were largely exempted
from taxation, and were e\"Cn allowed to bring
technicians freely into the country "( this sen·
tence refers to Thailand in the mid 1970s) : on
p. 147, ".. less than 30 percent of the farms were
still owneroperated" (Thailand in the late 1960s) :
and on p.309. "In 1986, then, at the height of the
'miracle' . These arc not true. In the case
of the last quote, the height of the miracle economy
came a few years later (if it is measured in terms of
economic growth). Nineteen eighty-six was a reces-
sion year for most of the mi racle economies of
Southeast Asia.
The author attributes the change of economic pol-
icy in Thailand in the late 1950s to the "prodding of
the World Bank" (p. 268). Although this is often
said, it is not quite right. The World Bank encour-
aged the developing countries to open the country
for foreign in vestment and pri \'atize state enter-
prises, but Thailand was practically the only coun-
try in the 1950s which heeded the advice of the
Bank. This is because the World Bank mission
which gave that advice was engineered by conserva-
tive economic bureaucrats, who could get it im-
plemented with Sarit's backing. Sarit needed eco-
nomic development to justify his authoritarian rule.
Chapter 14. entitled "Sauve Qui Peut." which
deals with the present financial crisis, is, at best,
mediocre. This is largely because a number of
good papers have been already written on it by econ-
omists at universities, think-tanks, private research
institutes, and international organizations such as
ll\lF. I was hoping that the author could give a
good political economy explanation. but there was
nothing new there, either. The type of error non-
econom ists (and e\"l'n many economi sts) fall in to is
demonstrated in the first paragraph on p. 305, which
compares Korea with Southeast Asian countries.
Because Korea used resources during the boom
years for building human resources. it "will recover
quickly from the Crash." Korea may recover more
quickly, but if it does, it would not be related to a
higher level of education. The better educated are
politically conscious and demanding, so that the
policy needed to O\'ercome the Crash can be more
difficult to implement. Thailand may be able to
overcome it more quickly because the people are
less \"C)ciferous and opposition to IMF is weaker.
Of course, the author is correct in saying that un-
less Thailand builds up its human resources, it will
not be able to return to the high growth path of the
past.
Another unsatisfactory part IS the chapters on
Philippine politics (especially Chapter 9. entitled
"Casique Democracy in the Philippines"). The au-
thor borrowed such terms as "casique democracy"
and "oligarchy," but they are left undefined. Are
the casique the landed upper class'~ If so, why did
they allow during the "hey day" of casiquL' democ-
racy (1954-72) import substitution and other poli-
cies which harmed the interest of the agricultural
sector? Import substitution policy in particular made
it difficult to import inputs (such as agricultural
machinery) or made them expensi \·e. and contrib-
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uted to the decline of export crops. Or are the
casique the upper class? If so, why was Marcos
the supreme casiQue? If casiQue democracy is the
rule for the upper class, Marcos should have bene-
fited the upper class, but in fact, he harmed many
old rich (such as Lopez and other sugar barons)
and created new crony capitalists? Also, the term
"oligarchy" is bothersome. Clearly, not the same
families are running the country, for many presi-
dents in the postwar period came from unknown
families. Is it a rule by a few, as defined in the
dictionary? But is it so in the Philippines? If the
head of state is more powerful in the Philippines, it
is probably because of the presidential system.
What needs to be done is to define the terms "casi-
que" and "oligarchy" in a functional way and ex-
plain in what way Philippine politics is casiQue
democracy or oligarchy.
In Chapter 15, entitled "Majorities and Minor-
ities," the author explains why Chinese fared dif-
ferently in post-independence Southeast Asia
(pp. 328-329). He points out correctly that they
fared worst in the socialist states of Indochina and
Burma. He is also right in saying that "in the
Catholic Philippines and Buddhist Siam they have
made the necessary cultural adaptations." But he
then says that "Thanks to British and Dutch colo-
nial policies, this integration is much less complete
in Indonesia and Malaysia." Colonial policy may
have had some influence, but the author is com-
pletely silent on Islam. Both the Philippines and
Indonesia, where Chinese constitute a small min-
ority (about 1% in the former and 3% in the latter),
pursued nationalistic policy in the immediate post-
independence years and made life difficult for
Chinese; but by the 1980s, the former had aban-
doned anti-Chinese policy and Chinese had made
"cultural adaptations," while in the latter, Chinese
still have not made such adaptations. The main
reason for this difference seems to be religious.
But, curiously, the author is silent on the influence
of Islam on majority-minority relations in Indonesia
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and Malaysia.
Here and there, the author's liberal-left leaning
shows up. Nothing is wrong with it if his analysis is
correct, but it seems to blind him sometimes. On
p. 168, he says:
Sarit and his heirs had betrayed the country
to the Americans. Never before in Thai his-
tory had almost 50,000 foreign troops been sta-
tioned on Thai soil. The economy had been
allowed to fall overwhelmingly into foreign
hands. For all the talk of national identity, the
dictators had complacently permitted the cor-
ruption of Thai society and culture . . .. All
in all, the policies of the right had proven not
only venal and opportunistic, but shortsighted
and ultimately bankrupt.
Did Sarit betray the country to the Americans?
Did the economy fall overwhelmingly into foreign
hands? I doubt it very much.
But a more contentious issue dividing the left and
the right is whether American involvement in the
Vietnam War was beneficial or harmful to Thailand.
Certainly, it was an expensive war for the Amer-
icans (both in material and human terms), but
didn't it benefit Thailand by saving the country
from the devastating rule of Communists? Just
think about the poverty and human rights suppres-
sion in Vietnam. Most Thais certainly would not
want that. Emotions still run high on this Question,
so that we have to leave it to future social scientists
to give a detached view. An "overwhelming" ver-
dict can be positive.
The Thai state did not defeat the Communists just
because it was lucky in the sense that the Commu-
nist Party of Thailand could no longer get Chinese
assistance after the three-cornered war broke out
between China, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late
1970s, but the cessation of Chinese assistance was
undoubtedly a major reason. The author says on
p. 290 that Peking stopped supporting CPT because
it was interested more in saving Pol Pot and had to
get the help of the Thai military in sending goods to
him through Thai territory. This is sometimes said
and certainly makes sense. but is it an intelligent
guess or is there any evidence supporting it, I won-
der. I have never seen it documented.
The few critical remarks above should not be in-
terpreted to mean that there are a lot of flaws in the
book. There are some in my view. but they are
greatly outweighed by good parts. The author
shows through this book as well as the previous one
(Imagined Communities: RejlectiOl1s on the Origin and
Spread oj Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991) that
Southeast Asian studies is not just a data-collection
or public service endeavor but that it can be highly
stimulating intellectually,
(Yoshihara Kunia (u'* J\1>1;:) . CSEAS)
Steve Heder: and Judy Ledgerwood, eds.
Propaganda. Politics, and Violence in Cambodia:
Democratic Transition under United NatiOl1s
Peace-keeping. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996,
xx+277p,
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